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In re Parental Rights as to S.L., 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 59 (August 5, 2018)1 
 
FAMILY LAW: TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 
 
Summary 
 
The Court determined that termination of parental rights is valid when parents fail 
to take necessary remedial action for reunification with their children and the termination 
is in the best interest of the children pursuant to NRS 128.105(1)(a). 
 
Background 
 
Donald B. and Melissa L. are the parents of four children; the oldest of which is 
named S.L. In December 2013, S.L. appeared at school with a black eye and disclosed to 
a friend that Donald had hit her. A subsequent investigation revealed that S.L. had 
multiple abrasions and bruises that were consistent with abuse, and resultantly S.L. and 
her siblings were removed from their parents’ home and placed in the custody of Clark 
County Department of Family Services (DFS) in January 2014. In May 2014, the 
children were placed in a foster home. There, the children made disclosures to their foster 
mother about the nature and extent of the abuse S.L. endured while in their parents’ 
home. 
 
DFS filed a protective custody petition alleging that the children were in need of 
protection. Donald and Melissa entered pleas of no contest to the petition and were given 
court-approved case plans, which required them both to take individual remedial action to 
ensure reunification with their children. Among the many remedial actions enumerated 
under the parents’ individual case plans, both plans not only required that each parent 
acknowledge that S.L. was physically abused, but also that the parents collectively 
develop a plan for preventing reoccurring abuse.  
 
Although Donald and Melissa engaged in most of the requirements of their 
individual case plans, by the time of the permanency and placement review hearing 
regarding their children in January 2015, DFS recommended termination of parental 
rights on the basis that the parents had not provided an explanation for S.L.'s injuries or a 
plan for preventing their reoccurrence. Thereafter, a termination trial ensued.  
 
In December 2016, the district court entered an order terminating Donald and 
Melissa’s parental rights. The court found: (1) parental fault based on clear and 
convincing evidence that Donald had physically and mentally abused S.L. over a period 
of years; (2) the parents’ therapy did not address the physical abuse; (3) neither parent 
had shown the insight or behavioral change to protect the children from future abuse; and 
(4) the presumptions under NRS 128.109 applied because the children had been in foster 
care for 30 months. Donald and Melissa appealed. 
 
 
                                                        
1  By Maliq Kendricks. 
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Discussion 
 
Fifth Amendment rights 
 
On appeal, Donald and Melissa argued that the district court violated their Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by finding parental fault based on their 
failure to admit to the abuse of S.L. Conversely, DFS argued there was no Fifth 
Amendment violation because even though parents could not be compelled to incriminate 
themselves, they could be required to demonstrate that the children would be safe in their 
care. The Court reasoned that because the evidence of abuse was significantly more 
egregious and pervasive than precedent, the parents were considered high risk 
reoffenders, and the abuse was not meaningfully addressed in their mandatory therapy 
sessions, Donald and Melissa failed to prove that reunification with their children would 
be safe. Resultantly, the Court affirmed the district court’s decision, explaining that the 
district court did not terminate Donald and Melissa’s parental rights merely because they 
refused to admit to child abuse but instead because they did not engage in meaningful 
therapy designed to ensure that the children could be safe if returned to their home. 
 
Parental fault 
  
Here, Donald and Melissa argued that the district court’s finding that they failed 
to rebut NRS 128.109(1)(a)’s presumption with a preponderance of the evidence was 
incorrect. The statue provides that if a child is placed outside the home for 14 of any 20 
consecutive months, it must be presumed that the parent has demonstrated only token 
efforts toward reunification.2 Although S.L. and her siblings were separated from their 
parents for 30 consecutive months, Donald and Melissa asserted that they rebutted NRS 
128.109(1)(a)’s presumption of token efforts because they actively engaged in the 
requirements of their case plans and their failure to reunify with their children within the 
statutory time frame resulted solely from their refusal to admit to the abuse. Nonetheless, 
the Court determined that although Donald and Melissa participated in services under 
their case plans, they did not meaningfully address the abuse in therapy, and thus, their 
efforts for reunification with their children were feeble.  
 
Donald and Melissa also contended that the district court erred by concluding that 
termination of parental rights was in the children's best interests because the evidence 
demonstrated that the parents had completed the assessment and counseling requirements 
of their case plans, their younger three children wanted to return home, and their therapist 
opined that reunification was in the children's best interests. However, applying NRS 
128.105(1)(a)3, the Court disagreed. The statue explains that for the district court to 
terminate parental rights, it must be in the best interest of the children. The Court found 
that because the children’s foster family had provided them a safe and loving home for 
over two years, the children were doing well and had bonded with and integrated into the 
foster family, and the foster parents were willing to adopt them, the substantial evidence 
                                                        
2  NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.109(1)(a) (2017). 
3  NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.105(1)(a) (2017). 
 3 
supported the district court's decision that termination of Donald and Melissa’s parental 
rights was in the children's best interests. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Court affirmed the district court’s decision, finding that Donald B. and 
Melissa L. failed to engage in meaningful therapy to ensure that their children could be 
safe if returned to their home, failed to take more than token efforts to reunify with their 
children, and that termination of their parental rights was in the best interest of their 
children.  
